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upon one whose defense to the claim of the debtor appears worthless is much less than
upon one whose defense seems so clearly valid that the claim of the debtor against him
is groundless. This rationale affords a basis for the reconciliation of the cases involving
choses in action. In Thomas v. Winslow9 the taking by the defendant was so clearly
wrongful that it was hardly conceivable that he could raise a valid defense. In the instant case and in the OrientalSteamship case the likelihood of a successul defense was
not similarly lacking. Although no case has yet arisen in which the court has refused
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over tangible property of the debtor, there
would seem to be no reason why the same distinction should not there be made. In
various situations involving tangible property a valid defense may be available to the
adverse party.10 Since, however, the wrong done to the tangible property by the adverse claimant will often be in violation of the four month limitation, it is conceivable
that the reorganization courts, in their desire to formulate a rule of thumb, may refuse
to recognize the suggested distinction.
In bankruptcy proceedings, the courts have refused to exercise summary jurisdiction over property to which a third party claimed more than a colorable title, even
though the property was within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.' In a reorganization proceeding the court on analogous reasoning might deny extraterritorial jurisdiction, believing that to force one having more than a colorable claim to go to the reorganization court would impose too great a hardship on him. The Supreme Court
has held that under § 77B(c)(zo) the staying by a reorganization court of a suit brought
by a creditor against the debtor corporation is not a matter of right to which the debtor
is entitled, but is within the discretion of the court.' 2 A similar conclusion under § 77B
(a) would not be an undue extension of the doctrine advanced in that case. 3 It is to
be regretted that the proposed bankruptcy reform bill,4 by incorporating the "exclusive jurisdiction" clause of § 77B(a), fails to resolve this ambiguity.
Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy-[Minn.].-The defendant's automobile collided
with another, killing A and B, the occupants of the other car. The defendant was acquitted of a third-degree murder charge arising out of the death of A. At trial for the
death of B, he pleads former jeopardy. The question was certified to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Held, that, since two separate offences were involved in the defendant's single act, the plea must fail and the defendant must stand trial for the death of
B. State v. Fredlund.'
9 Note 5 supra.
zoFor example see: In re Frances E. Willard National Temperance Hosp., 87 F. (2d) 894
(C.C.A. 7th 1936) (that mortgagee in possession after condition broken is, under Illinois Law,
the owner of the property and may not be ousted in proceedings under 77B); In re Lake's
laundry, 79 F. (2d) 326 (C.C.A. 2d 1935) (that conditional vendor under the state law retained

title to the property and right to possession on default, and the vendor's title negatived sufficient "property" in the debtor to include the chattel within the plan of reorganization).
11Hinds v. Moore, 134.Fed. 221 (C.C.A. 6th 19o5); In re Luken, 216 Fed. 89o (C.C.A. 7th
1914); see Gerdes, note 3, supra at pp. 245 et seq.

Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines, 299 U. S. 77 (1936).
1s See In re Midland United So., note 7, supra.
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Chandler Bill, H.R. 8046, 75th Congress, ist Session, July 28, 1937, c. X, art. IM, § iii.
N.W. 353 (Minn. 1937).
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RECENT CASES
The test employed in determining when offenses are the same, and the one purportedly followed in the instant case, is that they are the same whenever evidence adequate
to the one indictment will equally sustain the other.2 It is true that under this test,
more than one offence can arise from acts occurring on one occasion. Thus, one who
kills two people in the same affray may be tried separately for both killings.3 Even
where only one act occurs, several offences may arise. Thus, the act may involve two
different types of crime.4
When, as in the instant case, a single act results in the same type of injury to two
different people, some courts have interpreted the test as indicating that two offences
have occurred.s However, in People v. Majors, the statement of the court is merely
dictum. The Browning case is in point however. There, as in the principal case, the
court decided that different evidence wasnecessary to sustain each indictment, i.e.,
proof of injury to a different person. This seems an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the test, especially in the present case, since it is conceded in the question as
certified that both killings resulted from the same accident, leaving in issue only the
question of whether the defendant's conduct at the time of the accident was such as to
render him criminally responsible for the results of the accident. His acquittal in the
first case settled that issue. This first verdict did not mean that he had not caused the
death of A, but rather that his conduct was not criminal in spite of the fact that it
had caused that death.6 The fact that it also caused another death cannot make it so,
and the state is not entitled to have that issue tried again because of an immaterial
change in the nature of the evidence to be introduced.7
The court's analogy to the availability of separate civil suits is not compelling.
Since in civil actions for damages, the injured parties are not identical, separate actions
may be maintained, but in criminal prosecutions, the state is the only injured party,
and it should be allowed to seek satisfaction only once.8
Bishop, Criminal Law § 1051 (gth ed. 1923); see also Carter v. McClaughrye, 183 U.S.
365 (1902); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (i91i); Morey v. Commonwealth, io8
Mass. 433 (1871).
3 Commonwealth v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 372, 183 S.W. 898 (ig96); State v. BiUoto, 104 Ohio
St. 13, 135 N.E. 285 (1922).
4 See People v. Brannon, 7o Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924) (held, charges of assault with
intent to kill X, and of murdering Y may arise out of one act); State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383,
io6 N.E. 50 (1914) (held, one act of intercourse may result in prosecution for both rape and
contributing to the delinquency of a minor); United States v. Lanza, 26o U.S. 377 (1922) (one
state and one federal statute violated); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (two
territorial statutes violated); there may also be separate prosecutions for violation of two
statutes by the same act.
s See Commonwealth v. Browning, 146 Ky. 770, 143 S.W. 407 (1912) (two people hit by one
bullet); People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138,3 Pac. 597 (1884); but see contra, Clem v. State, 42 Ind.
420 (1873) (same facts); People v. Vitale, 364 Ill 589, 5 N.E. (2d) 474 (1936) (ten people killed
as result of one act of arson).
6 See Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 681, 21 S.W. (2d) 400 (1929).
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7 See 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § io6i (i) (9 th ed. 1923).

9 State v. Cosgrove, io3 N.J. L. 412, 135 At. 871 (1927); Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674,
21 S.W. (2d) 400 (1929).

